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While courts have created a doctrine of contributory 
trademark infringement in response to the expansion of 
goods and services from brick-and-mortar to the Internet, 
the exact duties of web hosts under the rule are not yet 
clear. Despite judicial attempts to carve out new standards 
to define traditional requirements, the application of these 
standards remains inconsistent and has left unresolved 
ambiguities. The disparities between the standards may be 
balanced through an analysis of the affirmative duties 
imposed by the law on online service providers, as well as 
a closer look at the relationship between a service provider 
and user. This Article reexamines the meaning of 
contributory liability for web hosts in light of their active 
and passive roles in such relationships, and considers the 
factors of good (and bad) faith in the conduct of 
defendants, practicability of affirmative duties, and 
inherent differences between types of online service 
providers as potential deciding factors. 
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In the e-commerce realm, online service providers (“OSPs”) 
continue to face potential liability for contributory trademark 
infringement, given the prevalence and profitability of counterfeit 
goods. As online accessibility to various markets for goods has 
rapidly increased in the last couple decades, courts have 
endeavored to stretch the scope of contributory infringement to fit 
new situations while keeping a limit on the accompanying 
expansion of property rights. Under the Lanham Act, a 
contributory trademark infringement claim requires showing that 
the defendant has “suppl[ied] its product or service to identified 
individuals that it knows or has reason to know are engaging in 
trademark infringement.”1 The elements of contributory trademark 
infringement are codified to some degree within the statute, but as 
of today, the doctrine remains a creature of common law, with 
discretion largely allocated to the courts.2 
The unique nature of the relationship between web hosts and 
web users has presented certain complications in finding the 
“correct” standard. The interpretation of the test for contributory 
trademark infringement ultimately determines how much of the 
burden OSPs and trademark owners respectively carry in 
monitoring trademark infringement in online venues. Thus, a clear 
formulation of the standard and how to account for real-world and 
legal inconsistencies is necessary. 
This Article attempts to define the present scope of online 
contributory liability by reconciling conflicting standards presented 
in the case law, focusing specifically on the “knowledge” and 
“control” requirements in the context of relationships between 
OSPs and users. Part I reviews the evolution of contributory 
trademark infringement standards. Part II analyzes the nuanced 
role(s) of the defendant web host under current judicial 
                                                                                                             
1 Lanham Act § 32(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1114(a) (2005). 
2 Deborah F. Buckman, Liability as Vicarious or Contributory Infringer 
under Lanham Act—Modern Cases, 152 A.L.R. FED. 573 (1999) (outlining 
notable federal cases on secondary liability for trademark infringement). 
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interpretations of the rule. Part III addresses remaining ambiguities 
by identifying three main balancing factors: (a) limitations on 
exclusive rights, (b) indications of a defendant’s good faith, and (c) 
the specific nature of a defendant’s services. 
 
I. THE CHANGING ROLE OF OSPS IN TRADEMARK 
INFRINGEMENT CASES 
 
In intellectual property law, liability for contributory 
infringement may extend to defendants even though they have not 
themselves infringed the protected creation. The test for 
contributory trademark infringement is harder to satisfy than its 
counterparts in copyright and patent law.3 But the basic principles 
are the same: if a plaintiff can support an underlying claim of 
direct infringement by one party, he may further assign 
contributory liability to a third party who has “knowingly 
encourage[d] or facilitate[d] illegal and tortious activity.”4 
The doctrine of contributory trademark infringement is overall 
a judicial construction “derive[d] from the common law of torts.”5 
In one of the earliest formulations of the standard, the Supreme 
Court in William R. Warner & Co. v. Eli Lilly & Co. held liable the 
manufacturer of the pharmaceutical product “Quin-Coco,” whose 
salesmen attempted to convince druggists that orders for the 
product Coco-Quinine could be filled with Quin-Coco more 
cheaply and without risking detection.6 The Court condemned the 
unfair advantage gained from passing off one product as another.7 
However, it emphasized that “[o]ne who induces another to 
commit a fraud and furnishes the means of consummating it is 
equally guilty and liable for the injury.”8 Thus Eli Lilly introduced 
the foundational elements of inducement and providing the means 
                                                                                                             
3 See 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 25:17 (4th ed. 2014) (noting that various courts have inferred 
this comparison from the Supreme Court’s discussion in Sony Corp. of America 
v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 439 n.19 (1984)). 
4 Id. 
5 Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 103 (2d Cir. 2010). 
6 See William R. Warner & Co. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 265 U.S. 526 (1924). 
7 See id. at 532. 
8 Id. at 530–31. 
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to infringe in the context of unfair competition. 
In Inwood Labs, Inc. v. Ives Labs, Inc., the Supreme Court first 
laid out the test for contributory trademark infringement: 
 
[I]f a manufacturer or distributer [sic] intentionally 
induces another to infringe a trademark, or if it 
continues to supply its product to one whom it 
knows or has reason to know is engaging in 
trademark infringement, the manufacturer or 
distributor is contributorially responsible for any 
harm done as a result of the deceit.9 
 
Thus the two main factors under the Inwood standard are 
inducement, or, alternatively, a knowledge standard of knowing or 
having reason to know. 
Originally framed to fit the manufacturer-distributor 
relationship, the Inwood standard has since been adapted for other 
types of relationships which possess the requisite inducement and 
knowledge elements. In Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp. v. 
Concession Services, Inc., the Seventh Circuit declared the 
standard applicable to landlord-tenant and licensor-licensee 
relationships,10 recognizing that a major issue was whether the 
defendant flea market operator was in a position to suspect and 
investigate the sale of counterfeit items on the premises.11 This 
holding introduced the rule that where a third party passively 
permits the infringing activities, “willful blindness” may support a 
finding of actual knowledge for the purposes of contributory 
liability. Similarly, in Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., the 
Ninth Circuit extended the scope of Inwood to a swap meet 
operator, noting that “[t]he Court in Inwood . . . laid down no 
limiting principle that would require defendant to be a 
manufacturer or distributor.”12 Beginning with these cases, courts 
                                                                                                             
9 Inwood Labs, Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 854 (1982). 
10 Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp. v. Concession Servs., Inc., 955 F.2d 
1143, 1149 (7th Cir. 1992). 
11 See id. at 1152. 
12 Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 265 (9th Cir. 1996). 
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expanded the application of Inwood to a new class of defendants: 
service providers.13 
Applying the Inwood standard to online service providers has 
been more complicated. In Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network 
Solutions, Inc., the Ninth Circuit modified the standard for 
application to OSPs, adding a new requirement of monitoring or 
control on the part of the OSP. Specifically, the plaintiff must 
show “[d]irect control and monitoring of the instrumentality used 
by a third party to infringe the plaintiff’s mark.”14 The court found 
that a registrar of Internet domain names lacked such control over 
the infringing use of domain names because the registering service 
merely handled the registration process and did not itself supply 
the domain name combinations.15 
The Ninth Circuit continues to apply this modified Lockheed 
standard to other types of OSPs, such as web hosts for sales of 
goods16 or payment processing services.17 
However, a number of courts including the Second Circuit and 
district courts in the Sixth and Ninth Circuits have applied the 
original Inwood formulation to OSPs in a variety of contexts: 
online auction sites,18 websites that host online transactions for the 
sale of goods,19 and providers of email addresses.20 
                                                                                                             
13 See, e.g., Coach, Inc. v. Goodfellow, 717 F.3d 498, 503 (6th Cir. 2013) 
(relying on Hard Rock Cafe and Fonovisa to apply Inwood to a service which 
rented booths and storage units to vendors). 
14 Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 194 F.3d 980, 984 
(9th Cir. 1999). 
15 See id. 
16 See, e.g., Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Akanoc Solutions, Inc., 658 
F.3d 936, 942 (9th Cir. 2011) (noting that the Lockheed test of “direct control 
and monitoring” applied where defendants provided a website-hosting service). 
17 See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Intern. Serv. Ass’n, 494 F.3d 788, 807 
(9th Cir. 2007) (applying Lockheed as an “extension” of Inwood to bank 
associations which processed credit card payments to websites with infringing 
material). 
18 See, e.g., Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010). 
19 See, e.g., Chloe SAS v. Sawabeh Info. Servs. Co., No. CV 11–04147 
GAF (MANx), 2014 WL 4402218, at *6, *22 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 5, 2014) (finding 
implied intent under the Inwood standard against online companies which 
established a “haven” for counterfeiting of luxury brands). 
20 See, e.g., W.W. Williams Co. v. Google, Inc., No. 2:13–cv–713, 2013 
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To better understand the significance of this divergence, it is 
important to examine the core elements of these standards. 
 
II. THE CONTEMPORARY ELEMENTS IN ACTION 
 
To satisfy the Inwood standard, a plaintiff can show 
inducement of the infringing activity or the defendant’s possession 
of a requisite level of knowledge.21 Whereas the requirement of 
“knowledge” targets OSPs which do no more than “turn a blind 
eye” to infringement, the control element of the Lockheed standard 
introduces a more complicated question about the overall 
relationship between the OSP and the infringer. 
Because much uncertainty in the case law lies in determining 
what the knowledge requirement entails,22 the following discussion 
will examine the element and its relationship to the control 
element. This section will focus mainly on the Second, Fourth, and 
Ninth Circuits as having produced notably conflicting standards. 
 
A.  The Knowledge Element and Willful Blindness 
 
The knowledge element targets behavior that “designedly 
enabl[es]” infringing activity23—which can include both passive 
and active conduct. Courts tend to illustrate this element in terms 
of what it is not. In Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93 (2d 
Cir. 2010) (Tiffany II), the Second Circuit held that general notice 
of infringement provided to the online auction site eBay was not 
enough to satisfy Inwood.24 Rather, the service provider would 
                                                                                                             
WL 3812079, *8–9 (S.D. Ohio July 22, 2013) (classifying email accounts as 
services, and applying Inwood to Google as a service provider). 
21 See Inwood Labs, Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 854 (1982). 
22 Rebecca Dunlevy, Internet Immunity: The Limits of Contributory 
Trademark Infringement Against Online Service Providers, 22 FORDHAM 
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 927, 950 (2012) (noting that a split in the tests 
used by the courts has resulted in differing standards for the level of knowledge 
required). 
23 William R. Warner & Co. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 265 U.S. 526, 530 (1924). 
24 See Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 107 (2d Cir. 2010). 
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need to have specific knowledge of individual acts of infringement, 
such as the identities of particular infringing sellers.25 While this 
approach points to a threshold level of knowledge, the only 
guiding interpretation of “specific knowledge” it provides is 
“contemporary knowledge of which particular listings are 
infringing or will infringe in the future.”26 The key distinction 
between passable “specific knowledge” and insufficient “general 
knowledge” is the knowledge of particular infringement, as 
opposed to background knowledge that infringement is happening. 
The Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition puts forth an 
alternate test, which extends contributory liability to defendants 
who fail to take reasonable precautions against the infringing 
activity where the infringement can be “reasonably anticipated.”27 
However, courts have favored Inwood over this relaxed standard—
the District Court for the Southern District of New York explicitly 
rejected such a relaxed standard in Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 
576 F. Supp. 2d 463 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (Tiffany I).28 This further 
suggests that the knowledge element requires something more than 
general knowledge. 
In practice, the knowledge element provides a mechanism to 
account for more passive forms of contributorily infringing 
conduct. The Second Circuit and Seventh Circuit have expressly 
indicated that “willful blindness,” defined as the deliberate failure 
to investigate suspected wrongdoing,29 is an alternative way to 
satisfy the element.30 Under this standard, intent to facilitate 
infringement may be inferred from the defendant’s knowing 
actions (or non-actions), such as the willful establishment of 
                                                                                                             
25 See id. at 109. 
26 Id. at 107. 
27 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 27 (1995). 
28 See Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 510 (S.D.N.Y. 
2008) (“[N]either precedent nor policy supports Tiffany’s contention that 
generalized allegations of infringement provide defendants with knowledge or a 
reason to know of the infringement.”). 
29 See Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp. v. Concession Servs., Inc., 955 F.2d 
1143, 1149 (7th Cir. 1992). 
30 See Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 109 (2d Cir. 2010); Hard 
Rock Cafe, 955 F.2d at 1148. 
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business conditions that are highly conducive to infringement.31 In 
Hard Rock Cafe, the Seventh Circuit noted that in applying the 
“willful blindness” approach, the district court should have focused 
more on the defendant’s state of mind and less on its external 
conduct (i.e., the defendant’s failure to take precautions against 
infringing activity).32 However, plaintiffs need not prove express 
intent.33  
Overall, the knowledge element creates a threshold for 
determining when a defendant should have taken affirmative action 
against the infringement. Such action includes taking reasonable 
corrective measures against individual instances of infringement 
when notified.34 The Second Circuit held that eBay could not be 
expected to police trademark infringement on its site. The court 
found that eBay’s corrective measures were satisfactory, having 
dealt with the specific instances of infringement actually brought 
to its attention.35 The Seventh Circuit was also careful to point out 
                                                                                                             
31 See Chloe SAS v. Sawabeh Info. Servs. Co, No. CV 11-04147 GAF 
(MaNx), 2014 WL 4402218, at *22 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 5, 2014) (finding that 
defendants’ actual awareness of each infringement did not matter where 
defendants had “deliberately established a haven for trademark infringement and 
counterfeiting”). 
32 See Hard Rock Cafe, 955 F.2d at 1149. 
33 See, e.g., Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Akanoc Solutions, Inc., 658 
F.3d 936, 943 (9th Cir. 2011) (rejecting the argument that contributory 
infringement must be intentional); Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 
F.3d 1146, 1172 (9th Cir. 2007) (recognizing that intent may be inferred from “a 
service provider’s knowing failure to prevent infringing actions”). 
34 The Second Circuit reasoned: 
 
[A]lthough the NOCIs and buyer complaints gave eBay reason 
to know that certain sellers had been selling counterfeits, those 
sellers’ listings were removed and repeat offenders were 
suspended from the eBay site. Thus Tiffany failed to 
demonstrate that eBay was supplying its service to individuals 
who it knew or had reason to know were selling counterfeit 
Tiffany goods. 
 
Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 109 (2d Cir. 2010). 
35 See id. at 109–10. 
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that the knowledge requirement does not impose an affirmative 
duty of action on service providers: “Although the ‘reason to 
know’ part of the standard for contributory liability requires CSI 
(or its agents) to understand what a reasonably prudent person 
would understand, it does not impose any duty to seek out and 
prevent violations.”36 However, once the service provider has 
reason to suspect users of infringement, it may not “shield itself 
from learning of the particular infringing transactions by looking 
the other way.”37 
 
B.  Additional “Control” and the Dynamic OSP-User 
Relationship 
 
The Lockheed standard introduces an element of “direct control 
and monitoring” in the relationship between the service provider 
and the infringing user,38 which may be considered an addendum 
to the knowledge element, or an altogether separate requirement. 
This addition arises from the Ninth Circuit’s distinction between a 
product and a service which would necessitate further 
considerations of how much control a defendant has over an 
infringer.39 Citing Hard Rock Cafe, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that 
in the case of a product, a manufacturer more clearly supplied 
infringers with the instrumentality to infringe, whereas a closer 
link was necessary to show contributory liability for service 
providers.40 
Unlike the basic Inwood knowledge requirement, this 
heightened standard accounts more consistently for active conduct 
by the defendant. It assesses not only a threshold for when the 
defendant should take preventative action, but also when a 
defendant may have been actively contributing to the infringement. 
This is in accord with a reading of Inwood as containing not only a 
“knows or has reason to know” element but also a “continues to 
                                                                                                             
36 See Hard Rock Cafe, 955 F.2d at 1149. 
37 See Tiffany, 600 F.3d at 109. 
38 Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 194 F.3d 980, 984 
(9th Cir. 1999). 
39 See id. 
40 See id. 
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Examples of courts applying the Lockheed standard show that 
certain types of OSPs may inherently lack a clear link to infringing 
uses of its services. Lockheed suggests that domain name registrars 
are such a class, because the defendant performed only registering 
services and had limited control.42 On the other hand, the court 
suggested that an OSP that performs “hosting” functions, checks 
for registrants’ rights to use particular words, or monitors the use 
of domain names after registration might exert the appropriate 
level of control.43 In Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Intern. Serv. Ass’n, the 
Ninth Circuit also held that defendants did not have “direct 
control” where their online payment systems were being used to 
process payments for infringing material.44 The court suggested 
that sufficient evidence of control would include a showing of 
defendants’ “power to remove infringing material from [infringing 
websites using the payment system] or directly stop their 
distribution over the internet.”45 
While the Second Circuit in Tiffany II found it unnecessary to 
perform a “control” analysis for deciding whether the modified 
Inwood standard applied to eBay,46 the district court had concluded 
through applying a set of determining factors that eBay did exert 
“significant control” over transactions and listings on its site.47 
While this set of factors pertains specifically to eBay’s services, 
scholars have recognized that they may be used generally in 
determining an OSP’s degree of control over the infringing 
instrumentality. The relevant points are: (1) the OSP’s degree of 
control over the website’s software and what type of service it 
provides; (2) the OSP’s use of plaintiff’s mark to promote its 
                                                                                                             
41 Inwood Labs, Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 854 (1982). 
42 See Lockheed Martin, 194 F.3d at 984. 
43 See id. at 982. 
44 See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Intern. Serv. Ass’n, 494 F.3d 788, 807 (9th 
Cir. 2007). 
45 Id. 
46 See Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 105–06 (2d Cir. 2010). 
47 See Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 505–07 
(S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
11
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website; (3) economic benefit the OSP derives through the use of 
plaintiff’s mark; (4) the OSP’s control over specific features of the 
website; and (5) exceptions for nominative uses of plaintiff’s mark 
(such as use for describing products).48 
Some scholars have noted that, given the disparity between 
standards and the lack of a systematic approach in case law, there 
is uncertainty about whether the additional “control” requirement 
applies to a given OSP or whether the basic “knowledge” 
requirement suffices.49 But the standards may be reconciled; both 
focus on the nature of the relationship between the service provider 
and the user. 
The key inquiry is not necessarily about choosing one standard 
over another, but rather understanding the nuances of this 
relationship. In this sense, one major issue is whether the 
infringing use of the OSP’s services is an isolated act or part of a 
course of an ongoing or past relationship. For evidentiary 
purposes, “isolated instances of fraud” are insufficient to show a 
defendant’s complicity.50 However, the broader framework for the 
“general vs. specific knowledge” concept suggests that a resolution 
is not so simple. 
Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc., 676 F.3d 144 (4th Cir. 2012) 
(Rosetta Stone II) suggests that at least some question remains as 
to whether contributory liability requires specific instances of 
infringement or if a more general course of dealing is enough. The 
case concerned language software company Rosetta Stone’s claim 
that search engine Google was contributorily liable for the 
infringing conduct of third party advertisers.51 The infringing 
advertisers purchased Rosetta Stone’s marks through Google’s 
keyword auction tool and subsequently used the marks in Google’s 
                                                                                                             
48 See Lauren E. Sims, When Enough Control is Not Enough: The 
Conflicting Standards of Secondary Liability in Rosetta Stone, 26 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 655, 681 (2011) (reformulating the five factors to account for general 
characteristics of OSPs other than eBay). 
49 See Dunlevy, supra note 22, at 950. 
50 This is true at least in the context of manufacturers, but presumably also 
service providers subject to Inwood. 4 LOUIS ALTMAN & MALLA POLLACK, 
CALLMANN ON UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS & MONOPOLIES § 23:10 
(4th ed. 2014). 
51 See Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc., 676 F.3d 144, 152 (4th Cir. 2012). 
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sponsored links to direct users to counterfeit Rosetta Stone 
products and competing products.52 Citing the Second Circuit’s 
finding in Tiffany II that generalized knowledge was insufficient, 
the district court held that Google did not apparently have specific 
knowledge of the infringing activity.53 The Fourth Circuit vacated 
the district court’s order granting summary judgment to Google, 
concluding that there was at least a question of fact as to whether 
Google knowingly continued to provide services to infringing 
users. The Fourth Circuit relied on evidence provided before the 
district court in Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc., 730 F. Supp. 2d 
531, 548 (E.D. Va. 2010) (Rosetta Stone I). This evidence included 
a spreadsheet reflecting Rosetta Stone’s notifications to Google of 
“approximately 200 instances of Sponsored Links advertising 
counterfeit Rosetta Stone products.”54 Despite having received 
such notice, “Google continued to allow Sponsored Links for other 
websites by these same advertisers.”55 
Although decided on a summary judgment standard, the Fourth 
Circuit’s decision leaves open the possibility that contributory 
liability applies not only to specific instances of infringement but 
to relationships as a whole—that is, the pattern of behavior a user 
establishes in the course of using the defendant’s services. The 
concept of the ongoing relationship is novel in that it emphasizes 
an infringer’s nature as a user of the services, rather than a 
numerical threshold of specific instances (which tends to exclude 
the more humanistic factors at play). While requiring less 
specificity, such a standard is not likely to extend contributory 
liability to findings of general knowledge, as established in Tiffany 
II.56 It might, however, fall somewhere below the Lockheed 
                                                                                                             
52 See id. at 151–52. 
53 See Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc., 730 F. Supp. 2d 531, 548 (E.D. 
Va. 2010). 
54 Rosetta Stone, 676 F.3d at 163. 
55 Id. 
56 See Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 107 (2d Cir. 2010) 
(agreeing with the district court’s interpretation of Inwood as requiring “some 
contemporary knowledge of which particular listings are infringing or will 
infringe”). 
13
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“control” standard and the Tiffany II “specific knowledge” 
standard. 
 
III. THE BALANCING FACTORS OF GOOD FAITH AND 
PRACTICABILITY 
 
Whether any particular standard is viable and when it applies 
may ultimately depend on certain balancing factors as indicated by 
case law. Among these are the underlying policy interests of 
trademark law, whether a defendant’s actions indicate good (or 
bad) faith, and the inherent differences between OSPs. 
 
A.  Limiting a Trademark Holder’s Exclusive Rights with 
“Control” 
 
Trademark law balances an interest in protecting the mark of a 
business or individual with a concern about improperly expanding 
property rights. This is especially true where contributory 
trademark infringement is concerned because the doctrine extends 
liability beyond traditional cases of direct infringement. As such, 
the imposition of an additional “control” requirement reflects an 
attempt by courts to limit this expanding scope. In Lockheed, both 
the Ninth Circuit57 and the district court noted this concern. The 
district court asserted that “[t]he solution to the current difficulties 
faced by trademark owners on the Internet lies in this sort of 
technical innovation, not in attempts to assert trademark rights over 
legitimate non-trademark uses of this important new means of 
communication.”58 
Some scholars have criticized this heightened standard, arguing 
that it is an incorrect interpretation of the doctrine,59 or a somewhat 
                                                                                                             
57 See Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 194 F.3d 980, 984 
(9th Cir. 1999) (“Direct control and monitoring of the instrumentality used by a 
third party to infringe the plaintiff's mark permits the expansion of Inwood 
Lab.’s ‘supplies a product’ requirement for contributory infringement.”). 
58 Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 949, 968 
(C.D. Cal. 1997). 
59 See Dunlevy, supra note 22, at 958–59 (“The Ninth Circuit . . . fails to 
fully reason out why this distinction is necessary based on the extension of 
liability in Hard Rock Cafe and Fonovisa to landlords and licensors.”). 
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redundant addition to a knowledge standard which is already 
difficult to satisfy.60 However, scholars have also pointed out that 
the “control” element “recognizes the distance at which OSPs and 
third parties transact and the difficulty with requiring OSPs to 
personally monitor every use of their services,” in comparison to 
real world business models.61 As such, the value of a “control” 
requirement cannot easily be discounted, nor can the likelihood 
that courts will continue to apply it. 
 
B.  Potential Benefits to the Service Provider 
 
A “good faith” analysis may be split into two parts: the 
circumstantial role of economic incentives to the defendant, and 
actual preventative measures taken by the defendant. As shown in 
the standard of “willful blindness,” an important rationale behind 
contributory trademark infringement is preventing service 
providers from abetting infringing activity where they have 
economic incentives to do so. Again, this reflects the doctrine’s 
origins in tort and unfair competition law. 
Given the nature of the relationship between certain types of 
OSPs and users, OSPs often have significant incentives to aid 
infringement or turn a blind eye. For example, as the Second 
Circuit noted in Rosetta Stone II, Google profited from clicks on its 
sponsored links and thus had incentives to allow activities that 
would increase traffic or otherwise promote its website.62 
Similarly, in Tiffany I, the district court considered the question of 
economic benefit among the factors for determining eBay’s degree 
of control over the instrumentality for infringement.63 Further 
                                                                                                             
60 See Sims, supra note 48, at 663 (“[O]ne might argue that an element of 
‘control’ is already incorporated into the knowledge standard, which serves to 
mitigate the level of liability: if OSPs function predominantly through 
automated processes, then they likely have little human knowledge of how third 
parties are specifically using their services.”). 
61 Id. at 679. 
62 See Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc., 676 F.3d 144, 151 (4th Cir. 2012). 
63 See Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 505–07 
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) (noting, specifically, eBay’s promotion of its website using the 
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factors that may be relevant are the strength of the economic 
incentive and the plausibility of defendant’s allegedly contributory 
actions without the incentive. 
It should be noted, however, that economic benefit alone is 
insufficient for a finding of contributory infringement.64 
 
C.  The Feasibility of Preventative Measures 
 
Because OSPs function through automated processes, they will 
have little direct knowledge of what individual users are doing. 
This presents an obstacle both for plaintiffs who must demonstrate 
that such an OSP “knew or had reason to know” of infringement, 
and OSPs looking towards more aggressive policies against 
trademark infringement. As the district court reasoned in 
Lockheed, a domain name registrar cannot be expected to “monitor 
the Internet.”65 
Courts may then weigh any economic incentive against any 
mitigating actions by the service provider. For example, in Tiffany 
II, the Second Circuit emphasized eBay’s corrective actions in 
response to notifications of infringing listings in finding that it did 
not contributorily infringe.66 Conversely, although the district court 
in Rosetta Stone I found that Google took some measures to 
prevent infringing uses of keywords,67 the Fourth Circuit appeared 
to take greater notice of the fact that Google continued allowing 
infringing activity by users after being notified about the users.68 
While this factor should not undercut any duties for OSPs 
                                                                                                             
Tiffany mark). 
64 See Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc., 730 F. Supp. 2d 531, 548 (E.D. 
Va. 2010). 
65 Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 949, 962 
(C.D. Cal. 1997). 
66 See Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 109 (2d Cir. 2010). 
67 See Rosetta Stone, 730 F. Supp. 2d at 548 (reasoning that because Google 
had no mechanism for detecting specific infringement, there was little it could 
do besides prohibiting advertisements for counterfeits, notifying users of their 
responsibilities, and taking down individual advertisements when notified of 
infringement).  
68 See Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc., 676 F.3d 144, 163–64 (4th Cir. 
2012). 
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implied under the “knowledge” or “control” standards, courts may 
be willing to recognize when an OSP has done everything it could 
be reasonably expected to do in light of practical or economic 
limitations.69 
 
D.  Recognizing Inherent Differences Between OSPs 
 
Because each OSP is different, there may not be a single test 
that is applicable to all of them.70 In deciding exactly when OSPs 
have satisfied their burden, it may be useful to examine the specific 
nature of the individual OSP on a case-by-case basis. While this 
factor might indicate the degree of control an OSP has over user 
activity, this information alone may not reveal much about whether 
the OSP has satisfied its burdens. As such, it should be considered 
only in light of the overall standard being applied, and the factors 
described above.  
Based on a review of the case law, several characteristics of 
OSPs stand out as particularly important.71 First, what type of 
service does the OSP provide, e.g., name registering, payment 
processing, online marketplace? Second, did the OSP itself create 
or post the infringing material, e.g., using an algorithm-based 
program? Third, does the infringing material appear within the 
OSP’s own domain, e.g., on its web page? Finally, does the OSP 
facilitate the transactions within which the infringement takes 
place? If so, how—directly (by handling payments, like eBay) or 
other ways (via click-throughs, like Google)? In some instances, 
such as claims against domain name registrars, these 
individualized characteristics may affect a plaintiff’s chance of 
success. 
                                                                                                             
69 This factor is subject to two divergent interpretations: “industry standard” 
feasibility (i.e., which measures are reasonable relative to similar OSPs, taken in 
light of general practice standards) and literal, “state of the art” feasibility (i.e., 
which measures are possible given the technological environment in which the 
OSP operates). As can be seen in the case law examined in this Article, U.S. 
courts appear to favor the former at this point in time. 
70 See Sims, supra note 48, at 676–77. 
71 These incorporate some of the Tiffany elements. 
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The current challenge facing courts and online proprietors is 
determining the balance between controlling trademark infringing 
behavior and having to police activity beyond one’s control. 
Case law indicates that, while narrow, contributory liability 
standards may expand beyond situations in which web hosts have 
knowledge of specific instances of infringement. Balancing factors 
in the OSP-user relationship and considerations of good faith and 
legal doctrine must be taken into account to accommodate newer 
developments in the types of online exchanges available to service 
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 Analyze the balancing factors of good faith and the 
limitation of exclusive rights in light of the overall 
standard. 
 If necessary, address the specific nature of the OSP’s 
service(s), and consider the degree of control the OSP has 
over user activity. 
 Understand the nature of the relationship between the OSP 
and the infringing user—e.g., is the infringement ongoing 
or habitual, or is it an isolated act? 
 When advising a trademark holder: provide detailed notice 
to OSPs of individual acts of infringement whenever 
possible. Consider ways to give related OSPs notice of 
“repeat offenders” when these OSPs are likely to be 
involved. 
 When advising an OSP: ensure timely and effective 
responses to notifications of infringement.  
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